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Abstract— No matter how robust the employed security
mechanisms are malicious users or attackers will always find a
way to bypass them. In addition, National Institute of Security
and Technology mentions “In conjunction with appropriate tools
& procedures, audit trail can assist in detecting security violation
and flaws in applications”. Until now, in Multimedia
Communication Services (MCS), such as Voice over IP, audit
trails are not utilized in security audits due to (a) the lack of the
appropriate analysis tools and (b) privacy restrictions. In this
paper we report on the analysis of MCS audit trail by employing
a novel method for identifying “uncommon” traffic indicating
non normal behaviour that does not violate users’ privacy. We
rely on entropy theory and the notion of “itself information” to
quantify the randomness of specific message segments, and we
also introduce the term “actual itself information” for the
assessment of entire message randomness. To protect users’
privacy we hash audit trail’s data. For evaluating the
applicability of our proposed method we utilize an audit trail of a
real MCS provider published by honeypot project. Initial
outcomes show the feasibility of employing such a method to
recognize “uncommon” traffic, recorded in MCS audit trail.
Keywords— Multimedia Communication Services, Voice over
IP, Digital Forensic, Entropy
I. INTRODUCTION
Legacy telecommunication services provided by Public
Switch Telephone Networks (PSTN) focus mainly on voice
provision. In PSTNs, security, availability and reliability rely
on a closed network architecture, while effective for voice
provision is considered an obstacle for the employment of new
advanced multimedia services. On the other hand, Internet
offers to telecommunication providers a variety of chances to
develop and employ new added value services at low cost.
Providers such as skype (www.skype.com), iptel
(www.iptel.org) are offering web based conference rooms,
namely Multimedia Communication Services (MCS), not only
for exchanging voice but also video, text and files at no cost
for Internet connected users.
Although users experience advantages from MCS, the main
drawbacks are vulnerabilities, threats and attacks introduced
by the Internet’s open architecture. Several researches [1-3]
indentify and report security flaws like fuzzing, flooding and
man in the middle (MitM) attacks. Simultaneously, in order to
shield MCS against these threats different approaches have
been proposed [4-6] by the research community, while MCS
providers and product vendors suggest the employment of
specific best practices [7],[8]. However, no matter how strong
the employed security mechanisms and countermeasures are,
malicious users will always find a method to bypass them.
Besides, administrators would like to examine the security
robustness of their information systems to ensure that systems
are free from attacks. For this purpose, administrators are able
to utilize different techniques and methods to evaluate system
security. For example, to identify vulnerabilities in the
provided services administrators can launch specific attack
scenarios using attack tools such as nessus (www.nessus.org),
Retina (www.eeye.com) etc, or they might assess the entire
system security by applying an audit methodology such as
CRAMM [9], COBIT [10]. At this point it should be
mentioned that security evaluation approaches, in most cases,
do not take into account the existing audit trails, mainly due to
the lack of appropriate tools for examining these audit trails.
Consequently, it might be mistakenly assumed that the
provided services are secure, while in reality they are
vulnerable to existing security flaws (e.g resource
consumption or other type of denial of service attacks) that
have not been identified or recognized yet, but “reside” in the
provided service. Even, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in [11] mentions “In conjunction with
appropriate tools & procedures, audit trail can assist in
detecting security violation and flaws in applications”.
For these reasons, it is of vital importance to identify
“uncommon” traffic that bypass the existing security
countermeasures and affects service’s availability, and
security by examining MCS audit trail in order to enhance
provided service security. Additionally, whenever such an
analysis is accomplished should take into consideration users’
privacy issues as audit trails include among the others
personal information. In this paper we report the analysis of
MCS audit trail by using a novel method for identifying
“uncommon” traffic indicating a security incident against
MCS. By the term “uncommon” traffic we refer to well
formed messages utilized by a malicious user to launch a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The proposed method is based
on information entropy theory [12]. For identifying
“uncommon” traffic we rely on the “itself information” of the
entropy theory and introduce a new metric namely “actual
information” to evaluate entire’s message randomness for
detecting “uncommon” traffic. We utilize the hash form of
raw data to protect legitimates’ users privacy. Note that in our
analysis we assume that the only available information to
security examiners is the audit trail.
Even though in this work we focus on MCS services utilize
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [13], as SIP has been adopted
as the signalling protocol to handle multimedia sessions in
Next Generation Networks (NGNs), the proposed method can
also be employed in other multimedia and text based protocols.
To evaluate our method we utilize an MCS SIP based service
provider audit trail file that includes various types of attacks
according to the “honeypot project” (www.honeypot.org). Our
preliminary outcomes demonstrate that the proposed method
is able to identify particular “uncommon” messages that have
been involved in an attack attempt, without violating legal
users’ privacy.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we briefly describe the MCS infrastructure focusing
on SIP. In Section III we introduce the proposed MCS security
analysis model. In Section IV, we present some preliminary
results in terms of effectiveness and in Section V we discuss
the related work. Finally, in Section VI we conclude our work
and give pointers for future work.
II. MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATION SERVICES: ARCHITECTURE
A. MCS General Architecture
MCS services are designed with Internet architecture in
mind. As a result MCS has been developed as an application
layer service in the Internet architecture stack. At network
layer MCS utilize Internet Protocol (IP) [14], while at
transport either User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [15] or
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) [16] depending on the type
of the provided services. At application layer MCS does not
require only the exploitation of existing protocols like Domain
Name System (DNS) [17] but also multimedia aware
protocols. Particularly, for multimedia session handling,
different protocols have been proposed, such as SIP [13],
H.323 [18], MGCP [19], however for Internet based MCS,
SIP is considered the predominant protocol. Regarding media
transport protocols Real Time Protocol (RTP) [20] is utilized.
B. Session Initiation Protocol & MCS
SIP is an application layer protocol on Internet architecture
responsible for handling multimedia sessions. A, SIP network
infrastructure is consisted of the following logical network
entities:
 Registrar: proceeds users’ registration and store their
current position in order to forward them new incoming
requests and responses.
 Proxy: locates the requested resource and provided it to
the end user. Note that the requested resource could be
either multimedia content or an MCS end-user, depending
on the type of the provided service.
 User Agent: correspond to end – users entities that acting
on behalf of them by generating the appropriate request or
responding to an incoming one.
Figure 1 illustrates the general network architecture of an
MCS SIP based service architecture, as well as, the message
flow followed whenever a user would like to exploit a service.
SIP messages format follows a text based structure (see Figure
2) similar to HTTP message structure [21]. A more detailed
analysis for SIP could be found in [13].
Figure 1. An MCS SIP Based Network Architecture
Figure 2. An Example of SIP Message Structure
III. AN ENTROPY BASED ANALYSIS MODEL
A. General Description
It is beyond doubt that the appropriate analysis of audit
trails (log files) will exhibit the effectiveness of the employed
security mechanism, as an audit trail records every activity.
Taking into account also that malicious users in MCS services
utilize very similar messages (e.g flooding, signalling attacks)
in order to accomplish their attacks’ goals, we use entropy
theory and the notion of “itself information” to identify
message redundancies correspond uncommon behaviour by
analysing an audit trail. Before applying an analysis on the
raw data we hash them to protect users’ privacy. The proposed
solution is consisted of two basic modules:
 Hash: Users’ privacy is protected by hashing the
information included in MCS audit trail. As a result, no
one entity is able to deduce users’ specific preferences by
processing the hashed file instead of the actual audit trail.
 Entropy: This module identifies messages that have been
used in attack incidents against MCS, and can be utilized
to recognize the specific characteristic of the attack.
Figure 3 depicts the functional diagram of the proposed
approach.
Figure 3. The Functional Scheme of the Proposed Analysis Model
B. Description of the Proposed Model
1) Itself Information & Entropy
According to Shanon's mathematical theory of
communication [12], entropy is a measure of how uncertain
we are of an outcome. Specifically, considering that a symbol( ) in a specific set has probability ( ), then the “itself
information” (included in this symbol) is by definition:( ) = − ( ) (1)
The average of “itself information” connected to the set is
called entropy and is computed using the following formula:( ) = − ( ) × ( ) (2)
The entropy of a source set maximizes when all ( ) are
equal ( ( ) = 1/ ). This means that the uncertainty of the
outcome is maximized, while the redundancy in set S is
minimized. With respect to “self information” this fact
indicates that all messages (or alternatively symbols) contain
the same amount of information. Note that the greater the
probability of a specific message the less information is
included in it. Furthermore, in case where two symbols are
independent of each other then the “itself information” and the
entropy are calculated using the following formulas,
correspondingly: ( , ) = ( ) + ( )(3)( , ) = ( ) + ( )(4)
2) Our Context
The main purpose of this work is not only to identify
specific set of messages as malicious, but also to distinguish
the legitimate traffic from malicious one. Furthermore, given
that signalling protocols in MCS like SIP are text based with
high level of syntax freedom, it is not possible to predetermine
whether a group of messages are a part of a flooding attack or
any other type of attack. Note that the messages of resource
consumption flooding attacks and other types of DoS such as
signalling attacks are based on well-formed messages that
cannot be distinguished from legitimate ones. The only
difference from legitimate messages is the amount of similar
symbols included in the malicious messages.
Within this context, to compute the “itself information” of
each independent message existing in an SIP based MCS audit
trail, and the corresponding entropy values we define the
following sets:
 S1: corresponds to the entire SIP message.
 S2: corresponds to the FROM header of a SIP message.
 S3: corresponds to the TO header of a SIP message.
 S4: corresponds to the Call-ID header of a SIP message.
 S5: corresponds to the First-Line (requested resource) of
a SIP message.
The choice of these sets reflects the different types of SIP
messages that a malicious user could craft in order to launch a
resource consumption attack. A malicious user, for example,
could use exact the same message (S1 set) or may craft
different messages by modifying specific segments of MCS
message such as FROM, TO, Call-ID, headers or even the
First Line (sets S2 to S5) depending on the goal of the attack.
An “artificial” sample of these sets illustrates Table 1, where
each cell corresponds to a specific symbol of the set.
TABLE 1. EXAMPLE OF DEFINED SETS
Defined Sets





S1a1 S2b1 S3c1 S4d1 S5e1
S1a2 S2b1 S3c2 S4d2 S5e1
S1a3 S2b1 S3c3 S4d3 S5e1
S1a4 S2b1 S3c4 S4d4 S5e2
S1a5 S2b1 S3c4 S4d5 S5e2
S1a6 S2b1 S3c4 S4d6 S5e2
S1a7 S2b1 S3c5 S4d7 S5e2
S1a8 S2b1 S3c6 S4d8 S5e2
S1a9 S2b2 S3c6 S4d9 S5e2
According to entropy theory symbol redundancy indicate
lower entropy values. This means that some symbols in the set
have greater frequency corresponding to less “itself
information” compared to other symbols coexist in the
examined set. So, from our point of view under the ideal case
in an MCS service should not exist message redundancies in
the incoming requests (SIP messages), except those occur due
to retransmission.
In our model a message is characterized as “uncommon” if
the itself information of a message is below a specific
threshold td1 or the distance from the ideal case is greater than
a threshold td2, during a time window tw. By distance we refer
to the difference between the maximum value and message’s
current “itself information” value. Exact the same case is for
entropy values in order to identify which specific set a
malicious user exploit during an attack. All thresholds are
parameters that should be defined by the MCS service
provider depending on the specific characteristics. A detailed
analysis of how to compute the appropriate thresholds is out
of the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, instead of examining each set “alone” we
define the actual “itself information” of the message as well
as the actual entropy of a set, taking into account that in our
model a message is consisted of S2,S3,S4 and S5 sets. In that
case the “itself information” and the entropy will be( 2, 3, 4, 5) = ( 2) + ( 3) + ( 4) + ( 5)(5)( 2, 3, 4, 5) = ( 2) + ( 3) + ( 4) + ( 5)(6)
3) Deployment Example
To demonstrate the proposed model usability we provide
herein a specific example. A real case scenario is presented in
Section IV. Particularly, considering that Table’s 1 data set
correspond to a privatized MCS audit trail raw data we
compute:
 the “itself information” for every part of the message
 the actual “itself information” of the message
 the entropy of each of these sets and
 the actual entropy of each of these sets
by applying the equations (1), (2), (5) and (6)
correspondingly. For example, the probability for each symbol
of S1 set is ( ) = 1/9 , the “itself information” for each
symbol of S1 set is ( ) = − log( ( )) , = 1 , and S1 set’s
entropy value is ( 1) = log , = 9. Similarly, we compute
the corresponding values for the remaining sets (S2-S5) (see
Table 2 & 3).
TABLE 2. EXAMPLE OF ITSELF INFORMATION










3.17 0.17 3.17 3.17 1.58 8.09
3.17 0.17 3.17 3.17 1.58 8.09
3.17 0.17 3.17 3.17 1.58 8.09
3.17 0.17 1.58 3.17 0.58 5.50
3.17 0.17 1.58 3.17 0.58 5.50
3.17 0.17 1.58 3.17 0.58 5.50
3.17 0.17 3.17 3.17 0.58 5.50
3.17 0.17 2.16 3.17 0.58 6.08
3.17 3.17 2.16 3.17 0.58 6.08
TABLE 3. EXAMPLE OF SETS ENTROPY
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 actual
Entropy 3.17 0.17 2.29 3.17 0.91 6.54
Max 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 12.68
Although the raw data of Table 1 is very limited and
artificial, by examining Table 2 & 3 can be deduced that set
S2 and S5 includes more redundant symbols compared to the
other sets. In this point, it should be noted that while the
“itself information” (see Table 1) of S1 illustrates that all
incoming request are different, (this is right because every
new incoming message, except retransmissions, should be
different), the actual “itself information” depicts that the
messages 4-7 include more redundant symbols compared to
other messages, which correspond to the actual symbol
redundancy included in these messages. This is the reason
why we define the actual “itself information” metric.
Additionally, the difference between the actual “itself
information” of these specific messages and the corresponding
maximum case is approximately 57% giving a clear indication
of symbol redundancy in messages included in the audit trail.
By examining the Table 3 we can identify the set with
lower entropy to deduce the type of attack launched against
the provided MCS service. The sets S2 and S5 not only have
the lower entropy values compared to the other sets but also
the difference between maximum entropy value (ideal case)
S2 and S5 entropy values (defined as distance in our context)
are approximately to 95% and 72% correspondingly, meaning
that the attacker has utilized SIP messages with the similar S2
(From header) and S5 (First Line) symbols. We have not
defined any specific threshold because the audit trail in this
case is “artificial”, however, even in this case by the
employment of the proposed solution we can deduce the
existence of “uncommon” traffic.
Considering all the above, the proposed solution could be
utilized to identify “uncommon” traffic indicating a DoS
attack traffic by analysing only an audit trail. Even in case that
we have not define specific thresholds service by observing
only the “itself information” and entropy values we have an
indication (or not) of a DoS attack. In this point one might
argue that a basic limitation of the proposed model is the case
of “complete” distributed attack in which all the messages will
be different and consequently the “itself information” and
entropy will be maximized. However, this case is similar to
mother’s day effect, in which a numerous of legal request
overloads a service. In the following section we present a real
case to confirm our initial outcomes.
IV. EVALUATION & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS BASED ON REAL
DATA
To evaluate the proposed method in terms of effectiveness,
instead of using artificial data (Section III.B.3) we use an
MSC audit trail file of a real provider, downloaded from the
honeypot project (www.honeypotproject.org). This audit trail
corresponds to five minute network traffic and contains 4266
signalling messages. To the best of our knowledge this is the
only published raw data of an MCS provider.
Based on our approach, at the first step is preserved users’
privacy, by hashing the raw data. So, the examiner is not able
to identify real users’ identities and their preferences.
Moreover, by such a method a provider could publish its log
data in order to “prove” its security level, without affecting
users’ privacy and violating any privacy legislation. At the
next step, we compute the “itself information” for each
symbol and the corresponding sets entropy. At the final step is
identified whether a specific message was a part of a DoS
attack as well as can be deduced the type of the attack.
Figures 4 to 8 illustrate the “itself Information” for SIP
Message, From, To, First Line and the actual “itself
information” correspondingly, while the entropy values of the
sets S1-S5 are presented in Table 4.
TABLE 4. REAL CASE ENTROPY VALUES
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Entropy 12.06 8.75 8.61 12.06 8.07
Max 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
Looking first at entropy values is clear that symbol
redundancy in set S2, S3 and S5 is 27%, 28% and 33%
respectively (the lower the entropy the greater the
redundancy). This fact represents “uncommon” traffic that
either corresponds to malicious user’s “different” attempts to
cause a DoS or to misconfigured user agents.
These sets of traffic could be considered normal only if the
specific MCS provider has defined an entropy distance
threshold greater than 30% for a time window 5 minutes. As
we are not able to infer safely the existence of “uncommon”
traffic without having particular entropy thresholds, we should
examine the “itself information” as well. Similar to the
example presented in Section 3, S1 set’s “itself information”
shows that all the incoming requests correspond to different
SIP messages (all the requests are different in the examined
file), without any degree of similarity (see Figure 4). However,
by examining individually the “itself information” for sets S2,
S3 and S5 (see Figure 5, 6 and 7) we can validate the existence
of similar symbols in these sets. For example the “itself
information” of messages with id greater than 3200 has
decreased at the value of 2, where the value of ideal case is
12.06. Additionally, the distance between the ideal case
(maximum “itself information”) and the corresponding “itself
information” values of set S1 for the messages with id number
between 3200 – 4000 is almost 90%, which is clear indication
of non-normal behaviour corresponding to “uncommon”
traffic. Note, that we have not used any specific threshold
because of lack of previous network traffic for this specific
MCS provider. At this end as we have mentioned earlier the
actual “itself information” correspond to the real symbol
redundancy included in the examined data (see Figure 8).
Consequently, instead of looking on different parts of the
messages we suggest the usage of actual itself information.
To validate our outcomes we examine the real audit trail
first for the message with lower “itself information”. The
results shows that the set of messages with lower “itself
information” was different registration (SIP REGISTER)
attempts by malicious users in order to identify legitimate
users’ passwords. For accuracy reasons we scrutinized the
audit trail for the messages with higher “itself information”,
which actually was different scan attempts utilizing SIP
OPTIONS method. The reason that our solution is not able to
identify these messages as “uncommon” traffic is because
these types of messages do not include redundant symbols.
Actually, this is the way that a legitimate user’s agent operates
to identify other users’ capabilities.
The outcomes demonstrate that the proposed solution can
effectively identify specific messages corresponding to
“uncommon” traffic. In any case in order to have a clear
indication of attack traffic against a specific provider is
suggested the employment of the appropriate entropy and
“itself information” thresholds. On top of that the definition of
“actual” “itself information” and entropy reflect correctly to
the symbol redundancy existing in a set of messages. All in all
our analysis can be utilized to evaluate and enhance MCS
security level as it is able to identify “uncommon” traffic
examining only the audit trail.
V. RELATED WORK
Various researches [22-26] have been accomplished to
identify resource consumption attacks as a part of network
intrusion detection systems (IDS), however, very few focus on
the analysis of MCS audit trail to identify and distinguish
“uncommon” traffic. Herein we refer only to the research
works that have some similar characteristics [22][26] to our
proposed model. Particularly, in [22] it is proposed an entropy
based mechanism to detect Spoofed Denial of Service attacks
by monitoring the distribution of destination/source IP
addresses; an alarm is raised if the entropy of specific IP
address set is less than a predefined threshold value. A similar
approach is used in [26] as well. These types of methods can
be utilized in MCS services to analyse audit trails or real data
traffic only on the IP level as do not take into consideration
application layer information. In our solution we are based on
entropy model as well, but we follow a difference approach.
We do not focus only on entropy, but also we utilize the
notion of “itself information” in order to identify specific
“uncommon” (well formed) messages. In addition we should
mention that in our approach we consider that the only
available information to security examiners are the audit trails.
The only published work that focus on forensic analysis in
MCS is presented in [27], which use predetermine attack
patterns to identify malicious events, by combining
information from different network components.
Figure 4. SIP Message (S1 set) Itself Information
Figure 5. FROM Header (S2 set) Itself Information

























































Figure 7. SIP First Line (S5 set) Itself Information
Figure 8. Actual Itself Information
VI. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
MCS providers do not utilize the audit trails during a
security audit due to (a) the lack of the appropriate tools, and
(b) privacy restrictions. Under this context, we propose a
method that by pass privacy restriction, while based on our
initial outcomes it provides an effective technique to identify
uncommon traffic. Particularly, we have exploit the “itself
information” and entropy to measure message randomness to
identify abnormal messages. Our initial results demonstrate
that we can reveal abnormal behavior that residing in an MCS
audit trail file. However, more extended tests are required in
order to validate and confirm the outcomes derived in this
work. Additionally, we are considering for applying the
proposed method as an intrusion prevention mechanism to
distinguish “uncommon” traffic in order to enhance MCS
security level.
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